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Contents of Volume 27

Number 1, June 1982

L. M. Benveniste and J. A. Scheinkman. Duality Theory for Dynamic Optimization Models of Economics: The Continuous Time Case 1

Beth Allen. Strict Rational Expectations Equilibria with Diffuseness 20

Yoshihiko Otani and Joseph Sicilian. Equilibrium Allocations of Walrasian Preference Games 47

Robert W. Rosenthal. A Dynamic Model of Duopoly with Customer Loyalties 69

Larry G. Epstein. Comparative Dynamics in the Adjustment-Cost Model of the Firm 77

Mukul Majumdar and Tapan Mitra. Intertemporal Allocation with a Non-convex Technology: The Aggregative Framework . 101

Donald K. Richter. Weakly Democratic Regular Tax Equilibria in a Local Public Goods Economy with Perfect Consumer Mobility 137

Sergiu Hart. The Number of Commodities Required to Represent a Market Game 163

Avner Shaked and John Sutton. Imperfect Information, Perceived Quality, and the Formation of Professional Groups . 170

Richard Jensen. Adoption and Diffusion of an Innovation of Uncertain Profitability 182

Lionel W. McKenzie. A Primal Route to the Turnpike and Liapounov Stability 194

Notes, Comments, and Letters to the Editor

Martine Duchatelet. A Note on Increasing Returns to Scale and Learning by Doing 210

S. M. Ravi Kanbur. Increases in Risk with Kinked Payoff Functions 219

Y. Y. Papageorgiou. A Probabilistic Model of Location Choice with Neighborhood Effects: Comment 229

James Hess. Risk and the Gain from Information 231

Yves Balasko. Budget-Constrained Pareto Efficient Allocations: A Dynamic Story 239

Papers to Appear in Forthcoming Issues 243

NUMBER 2, AUGUST 1982

CONTENTS

Reputations in Finitely Repeated Games

DAVID M. KREPS, PAUL MILGROM, JOHN ROBERTS, AND ROBERT WILSON. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 245
DAVID M. KREPS AND ROBERT WILSON. Reputation and Imperfect Information 253
PAUL MILGROM AND JOHN ROBERTS. Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence 280

REGULAR ARTICLES

JAN SVEJNAR. On the Theory of a Participatory Firm 313
PIERRE BATTEAU. Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods: Aggregation by Abelian Operations 331
MARIO GIRARDI AND GIORGIO ISRAEL. Some Quasi-Globally Stable Processes of Price Adjustment 353
TARADAS BANDYOPADHYAY, RAJAT DEB, AND PRASANTA K. PATTANAIK. The Structure of Coalitional Power under Probabilistic Group Decision Rules 366
LESTER G. TELSER. Voting and Paying for Public Goods: An Application of the Theory of the Core 376
PATRICIA B. REAGAN AND MARTIN L. WEITZMAN. Asymmetries in Price and Quantity Adjustments by the Competitive Firm . . 410

NOTES, COMMENTS, AND LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

MAKOTO YANO. A Note on the Existence of an Optimal Capital Accumulation in the Continuous Time Horizon . 421
YOSHIHIKO OTANI. A Simple Proof of the LeChatelier–Samuelson Principle and the Theory of Cost and Production 430
JACQUES CRÉMER. A Simple Proof of Blackwell's "Comparison of Experiments" Theorem 439
PETER C. FISHBURN. A Note on Linear Utility 444

PAPERS TO APPEAR IN FORTHCOMING ISSUES 447

AUTHOR INDEX FOR VOLUME 27 448